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The Responsibility of Transnational Corporations in 
the Realization of Children’s Rights 
Isabel Mota Borges1 
Abstract 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs), especially those operating 
in developing countries, have enormous socio-economic power—
sometimes more than states.  Many TNCs seek poor and unregulated 
markets, employing cheap, underage and fragile children, so they can 
create an economic competitive advantage and meet increasing inter-
national marketing demands.   While many of them bring business 
and prosperity to a region, the damages can outweigh these benefits 
they perpetuate when behaving irresponsibly - occasionally irrepara-
bly - detrimentally impacting on children’s enjoyment of civil, politi-
cal, economic, social, and cultural rights. The problem is exacerbated 
when national governments are unable or unwilling to regulate 
TNCs’ operations. It shall be argued that despite the private legal sta-
tus of TNCs, they are subjected to human rights obligations because 
some forms of exploitative child labor has become universally con-
demned and thus possess jus cogens status. The analysis shows that 
there is no deficiency within international human right standards re-
garding child labor and these maybe interpreted as giving direct obli-
gations to TNCs to respect, protect and fulfill children’s rights. The 
rising numbers of exploitative child labor, however, raises serious 
doubts about the effectiveness of those standards to adequately regu-
late powerful TNCs, which are not limited to concepts of territorial 
sovereignty. The results of the research depicts the desperate need for 
a renewed international legal framework going beyond soft law ap-
proaches, to clearly define legal obligations and methods to enforce 
responsibilities on: TNCs; states; other non-state actors; and the child 
 
 1. Ph.D. Research Fellow, University of Oslo, Norwegian Centre for Human Rights. This 
paper was selected and presented at the International Studies Association conference: 
Protecting Human Rights: Duties and Responsibilities of States and Non-State Actors, 
at University of Glasgow 18-19 June 2012. I would like to thank the following for 
reading and discussing earlier drafts Professors Beate Sjåfjell, Yutaka Arai and Mads 
Adenæs. 
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 2. See Jordan Paust, Article, Human Rights Responsibilities of Private Corporations, 35 
VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L 801, 802-820 (2002). 
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I. Human Rights and Transnational Corporations 
Whether one recognizes businesses as an essential factor for a 
country’s economic prosperity or focuses upon the damages that they 
may cause (for example, by exploiting child laborers) in the world 
today, Transnational Corporations (TNCs) are powerful entities scat-
tered throughout the globe.3 The 300 largest corporations account for 
roughly one-quarter of the world’s productive assets.4  For example, 
one automobile company’s sales in a single year are greater than the 
gross national product of 178 countries, including Malaysia, Norway, 
Saudi Arabia, and South Africa.5  [TNCs] . . . are involved in seventy 
percent of world trade.6  TNCs directly employ ninety million people 
(of whom some twenty million live in developing countries) and pro-
duce twenty-five percent of the world’s gross product.7 
Therefore, TNCs have substantial economic power that can be 
used against smaller, developing countries.  TNCs are not only pow-
erful economic entities, but they are mobile, have the capacity to 
evade national legislation and enforcement and because of the ease 
with which they can relocate they use their influence to pressure na-
tional governments to turn a blind eye to their abuses.8  Today, TNCs 
“operate in more countries than ever before, and increasingly in soci-
opolitical contexts that pose entirely novel human rights challenges 
for them.”9  
 
 3. Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors European Universi-
ty Institute, XV/I, THE COLLECTED COURSES OF EUROPEAN LAW, 31, (2006) 
(stating that Transnational Corporations are “usually a single legal corporation operat-
ing in more than one country, with headquarters and legal status incorporated in the 
national law of the home state.). 
 4. David Weissbrodt, Symposium, Keynote Address: International Standard-Setting on 
The Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L. 373, 375 
(2008). 
 5. Id.  
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id.  
 9. John Gerard Ruggie, Current Development, Business and Human Rights: The Evolving 
International Agenda, 101 AM. J. INT’L. 819, 823 (2007). This is particularly true of 
the extractive sector. For my 2006 report, I conducted a review of sixty-five NGO pub-
lications alleging significant corporate-related human rights abuses over the previous 
five years or so. Oil, gas, and mining accounted for two-thirds of the total. Virtually all 
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Child labor is a human rights issue; therefore, individuals and 
corporations are both capable of violating international human rights 
and by inference children’s rights -or example: the right to life (in-
cluding the right to enjoy life), the right to education, and freedom 
from torture and cruelty.10  Violations of such rights lead to inhuman 
or degrading treatment and, therefore, interfere with other prescribed 
rights such as: freedom from forced or slave labor; freedom from ar-
bitrary detention or deprivation of security of the person; freedom to 
enjoy property; freedom from deprivation of or injury to health, en-
joyment of a clean and healthy environment; and freedom from dis-
crimination.11 On the contrary, TNCs can bring massive benefits to 
the developing countries in which they invest; for example, through 
new medicines and technologies—which can enable the enjoyment of 
the right to health or the right to education.12  These benefits, howev-
er, can be outweighed by the damages they perpetuate when behaving 
irresponsibly – occasionally irreparably - detrimentally impacting on 
the enjoyment of civil, political, economic and social rights.13 While 
states have the primary responsibility to respect, protect and fulfill 
these human rights, it is increasingly recognized that companies [due 
to their power] have the responsibility to respect the human rights 
that are enshrined in international treaties and conventions, moving 
beyond mere voluntary ethical commitments of corporate accounta-
bility towards “a legal obligation to uphold international [child labor] 
standards”14 As Andrew Clapham rightly asserts, “If international law 
is to be effective in protecting human rights [of children], everyone 
should be prohibited from assisting governments in violating those 
principles, or indeed prohibited from violating such principles them-
selves.”15 Some commentators have highlighted that there are a num-
 
cases took place in low-income countries, of which nearly two-thirds either had recent-
ly emerged from conflict or were still immersed in it. Moreover, all but two of the 
countries fell below the global average for the “rule of law” developed by the World 
Bank. See Interim Report, supra note 19, paras. 24-30.  
 10. Paust, supra note 2, at 819.  
 11. Id.  
 12. Sarah Joseph, LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 613 (2008). 
New medicines include antiretroviral drugs. 
 13. Id.  
 14. Gerard Oonk, Child Labour, Trade Relations and Corporate Social Responsibility 6 
STOP CHILD LABOR (2004). 
 15. Clapham, supra note 3, at 31.  
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ber of strong views, which oppose the extension of human rights re-
sponsibilities to TNCs.16   
Firstly, corporations are in business and their only social ac-
countability should be towards their shareholders.17 Secondly, posi-
tive duties to observe human rights are the responsibility of the state, 
thus even if TNCs have some economic influence, only states have 
the capacity to protect civil and political rights.18  Thirdly, the exten-
sion of human rights obligations to businesses may create competi-
tive disadvantages, therefore, losing business opportunities between 
those that obey and those that ignore “free rider” international stand-
ards.19  Furthermore, “it is impossible to invest in TNCs sufficient in-
ternational legal personality to bear the obligations, as much as exer-
cise rights.”20  
The legal subjectivity of TNCs has long been a center of debate 
amongst academia, and while historically authors rarely ever sug-
gested that businesses had an international legal personality, the par-
ticipation of private corporations in the international scene allied with 
the globalization of their operations and the evidence of exploitation 
of child laborers has molded new perceptions.  Thus, “[t]he question 
of legal personality is rendered uninteresting altogether, as [TNCs] 
are in fact important participants in the evolution of international law, 
whereas the law itself can be slow to respond to this reality.”21 Ac-
cordingly, “a suggestion that responsibilities cannot be attached to [] 
TNCs because of lack of personality cannot be withheld.”22  Rather 
than focusing on personality of corporations one should focus on the 
rights and obligations of such entities.23  
 
 16. Id.  
 17. Id.  
 18. David Kinley & Junk Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 933-
35 (2004). 
 19. Peter T. Muchlinski, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES & THE LAW,  (Oxford 
Univ. Press, (2d ed. 2007). 
 20. Kinley &Tadaki supra note 18, at 947. 
 21. Viljam Engstrom, WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR CORPORATE HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS? 
310 (Institute for Human Rights 2002). 
 22. Id.  
 23. See Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors European Uni-
versity Institute, XV/I, THE COLLECTED COURSES OF EUROPEAN LAW, 31(2006). 
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There are numerous advantages for TNCs to adopt a human 
rights policy and behave responsibly.24  It enhances their trademark 
value, protects their reputation with regards to the wider consumer, it 
reduces the risk of strikes and protests, it attracts and retains a higher 
quality workforce, increases job satisfaction, and ultimately because 
it is “the right thing to do.”25  
Although changing company policies may not bring in the short 
term high profitability, in the long term staying “ahead of the game” 
will bring them increased profits and attract investment.26  In addi-
tion, due to their global nature, TNCs can promote the protection of 
human rights because they have the capacity to reach across borders 
and allow people—who probably would not otherwise do so—work 
together.27   TNCs may also be an indirect “conflict mediator” in 
countries with high levels of violence simply because they can bring 
economic development to the local population (provided that this 
does not lead to resentment and increased violence).28    
It shall be argued that despite the private legal status of TNCs, 
they are subject to human rights obligations because some forms of 
exploitative child labor have become universally condemned and, 
therefore, possess jus cogens status.29  The first part of the analysis 
shows that there is no deficiency within international human right 
standards—treaty and non-treaty based—regarding child labor and 
these may be interpreted as giving direct obligations to TNCs to re-
spect, protect, and fulfill children’s rights.30 The rising numbers of 
exploitative child labor, however, raises serious doubts about the ef-
fectiveness of those standards to adequately regulate powerful TNCs, 
which are, by definition, not limited to concepts of territorial sover-
eignty.31 The results of the research outline and the desperate need for 
a renewed international legal framework going beyond soft law ap-
proaches to clearly define legal obligations and methods to enforce 
 
 24. Id.  
 25. Id.  
 26. SeeClapham, supra note 23.   
 27. Id.   
 28. David Weissbrodt, Symposium, Keynote Address: International Standard-Setting on 
The Human Rights Responsibilities of Businesses, 26 BERKELEY J. INT’L. 373, 374 
(2008). 
 29. Id.  
 30. Weissbrodt, supra note 28, at 379-81.  
 31. Id. at 390.   
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responsibilities on TNCs; and where the role of the state, other non-
state actors, and the child itself are also key to ensuring effective pro-
tection and fulfillment of children’s rights.32  The article starts by por-
traying the definition, as well as the main types of exploitative forms 
of child labor.   
II. Defining Child Labor 
The term “child labor” means different things to different peo-
ple.33 There is no universally accepted definition of child labor and 
even the definition outlined below varies according to different coun-
tries and cultures.34 Children can engage in work in a variety of forms 
and are subjected to various environments; however, age limits vary 
according to the activity being carried out and location.35 Many socie-
ties, particularly poor, rural ones, do not condemn child labor even at 
the early ages of eight or nine years.36  Many do not even consider an 
eight or nine year old apprentice a child.37  This is due to a difference 
in conception or definition of “childhood”. 
When the image of a child changes, their rights also change.38  
The different social constructs of childhood throughout history have 
given us an evolutionary linear view of childhood ranging from 
“mini-adults” to “rights-holders”.39  This view generally considers the 
twentieth century as the “Century of the Child”.40   The emphasis on 
education and schooling for children (and not working), as a distinct 
phase in life formally appeared on the 1919 ILO Convention No.5 – 
Minimum age, Industry.41 
 
 32. Id.  
 33. Christopher Kern, Child Labor: The International Law and Corporate Impact,  27 Sy-
racuse J. Int. L. & Com. 177-78. (2000).  
 34. Id. 
 35. Christian Grootaert, Child Labor: A review, 38 (1995). 
 36. Id. at 3.  
 37. Id. at 38.  
 38. F. Humbert.. THE CHALLENGE OF CHILD LABOR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 14(Cambridge 
Univ. Press.  14 2009).  
 39. Id. at 15.  
 40. Id.  
 41. ILO convention (1919) available at 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=NORMLEXPUB:55:0::NO::P55_TYPE,P55_
LANG,P55_DOCUMENT,P55_NODE:CON,en,C005,/Document.   
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The sense of protection of the child appeared in the 1959 Decla-
ration of the Rights of the Child.42  However, it is in the Convention 
of the Rights of the Child’s 43 (hereinafter “CRC”) new concept of 
protecting the best interests of the child, best reflected in Article 3.44  
As stated in Article 3: “the child is now considered as a subject rather 
than an object of rights and duties.”45   
Despite the definition given by CRC even within the Convention 
the concept of childhood is not really universal.46  The Preamble of 
the Convention acknowledges that the conceptualization of childhood 
should take into account cultural and traditional values,47 “ linking the 
international definition of childhood to the national law on majority, 
the CRC attempts to accommodate the existing cultural and religious 
diversities reflected in different age limits”.48  As there are no unani-
mously agreed definition of childhood, there are also no consensus on 
the rights linked with the notion of childhood and what types of child 
labor should be eradicated.49   
International organizations, such as ILO and the UNICEF as well 
as legal commentators, refer to a continuum (which in reality is a 
two-tiered conception) when connecting children and work.50   On 
one side there is “child work” which is “beneficial” and that enhances 
a child’s physical, mental, social well being that does not interfere 
with a child’s rest, education, and recreational activities.51   This in-
cludes the concept of “light work” such as work which is not hazard-
ous and that does not exceed fourteen hours a week. On the other 
hand, there is “child labor” which is manly “exploitative”. 52  For ex-
 
 42. Declaration of the Rights of a Child (1959), available at 
http://www.cirp.org/library/ethics/UN-declaration.   
 43. Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx.  
 44. Id. , at art. 3.   
 45. Humbert, supra note 35, at 16. 
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.   
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. at 17.   
 50. Id. at 18. 
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. Defines exploitative child labor as work “carried out full-time at too early age; too 
many hours are spent on working; it exerts undue physical, social or psychological 
stress; it includes work and life on the streets in bad conditions; inadequate pay, too 
much responsibility; it hampers access to education; it undermines children’s dignity 
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ample, child prostitution and bonded child labor both deny access to 
education and impacts on the child’s social, physical and s health.53   
The CRC also reflects this new change of attitudes in Article 32 af-
firming that children have a right to be free from “economic exploita-
tion”.54  Nevertheless, much of child labor falls in the “grey area” of 

















and self-esteem, such as slavery or bonded labor and sexual exploitation; it is detri-
mental to full social and psychological development”. ILO adds the following catego-
rization of child labor: - Labor that is performed by a child who us under the minimum 
age specified for that kind of work (as defined by national legislation, in accordance 
with accepted international standards and that is thus likely to impede the child’s edu-
cation and full development; -Labor that jeopardizes the physical, mental or moral 
well-being of a child, either because of its nature or because of the conditions in which 
is carried out, known as hazardous work; and –Unconditional worst forms of child la-
bor, which are internationally defined as slavery trafficking, debt bondage and other 
forms of forced labor, forced recruitment of children for use in armed conflict, prosti-
tution and pornography, and illicit action. 
 53. Id.  
 54. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 32 (1989) available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/crc.aspx.   
 55. Humbert, supra note 35, at 15.  
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III. Types of Child Labor 
ILO (1996) and UNICEF (1997) delineate eight main types of 
exploitative forms of child labor: hazardous working conditions56, 
domestic service57, street children58, child labor in the informal econ-
omy59, child slavery60,  
 
 56. Id. at 19.  For example, children employed in the mining industry, involved in the 
manufacturing industry (for export such as carpets, garments, and soccer ball stitching) 
and within the agricultural sector (such as cocoa plantations) are endangering their 
health because of poor ventilation and lighting and suffer the effects of excessive 
noise, and exposure to dust and other chemicals during the development processes. 
Thus, they will inevitably suffer from respiratory problems (such as silicosis), regular 
headaches, hearing, sight, dermatological, muscle, wounds and joint problems putting 
at stake their long-term physical and mental well-being. In the service sector of the ho-
tel, fast food and tourism industry children are pulled into the lure of making money 
quickly with no real benefit for their education or health and might also be drawn into 
prostitution.  
 57. Id. at 21. Children in domestic service are frequently subjected to physical, psycholog-
ical, and sexual abuse and are thus highly exploited. They frequently work in isolation 
work long hours and some are unpaid (ILO 1996). This condition of “domestic serv-
ant” specifically domestic work performed by children outside the scope of their own 
household) is connected to the worst forms of child labor such as debt bondage and 
slavery (Noguchi 2005).   
 58. Id. Even though there is no universally accepted definition of street children “no one 
definition can capture the totally of the experiences of street children worldwide. A 
street child maybe “of the street” or “on the street”. A child “of the street” has no 
home but the street; such a child may have abandoned or been abandoned by his fami-
ly, of he may have no surviving family member”. Children who find themselves in 
these circumstances are commonly involved in selling food and small consumer gadg-
ets, window washing, shoe shining, tire fixing, rag picking, begging and puttering. It is 
not only the work they perform which is problematic but also the environment in 
which they work, as it exposes them to traffic fumes, harassment, and physical and in 
many cases - to sexual violence.   
 59. Id.  Children who work in the informal economy are sometimes described as invisible 
and are the least protected under legal and regulatory frameworks. Frequently the in-
formal economy is closely linked to the formal production sector. Evidence tends to 
suggest that in the manufacturing industry transnational corporations may engage 
small-scale family enterprises for the production of their goods. “Since most child la-
bor occurs in this sector and is beyond the reach of most formal institutions, it repre-
sents one of the principal challenges of the effective abolition of child labor”.  
 60. Id. One of the most known forms of slavery is family bondage where children inherent 
debt from their family and are obliged to work to pay it off. Bonded labor, clearly 
mentioned in the Supplementary Convention on Abolition of Slavery of 1956 is mostly 
found in the agriculture, textile, quarrying and construction sectors where the situation 
is often manipulated by the creditor making it nearly impossible for the borrower to 
pay back the loan. “The main difference between adult and child bonded labor is that 
children have not themselves contracted the debt- it was done on behalf of adults. The 
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trafficking and commercial sexual exploitation61 and children in 
armed conflict62 and illicit activities63 ILO as unconditional worst 
forms of child labor has named the last four of these.64 In the context 
of this paper “exploitative forms of child labor” and “child labor” 
shall be the main point of focus as opposed to “child work” which 
encompasses all forms of economic activity.65 The two terms will be 
used interchangeably to describe intolerable types of child labor. 
 
IV. International Regulation of TNCs 
In order to assess whether theoretically and practically if TNCs 
are bound to respect human rights and thus, children’s rights, one 
must assess the possible direct and/or indirect obligations derived 
from the established international legal framework protecting chil-
dren against labor exploitation, which inevitably, shall be shown, 
some modalities because they may constitute forced labor, torture or 
cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment have reached the level of jus 
 
link between child labor and the inter-generational perpetuation of poverty could hard-
ly be clearer. Bonded children flourish in different parts of the globe; not only in South 
Asia with which it is most commonly linked, but also in Latin America, Africa and 
South-East Asia”.  
 61. Id. Children are often trafficked for prostitution, for begging, and for other activities 
such as agriculture and domestic service. It is thought that child trafficking has become 
a billion-dollar-a-year business, with an estimated 1.2 million children falling victim 
annually. Child victims of commercial and sexual exploitation experience extreme 
forms of physical, psychological, and emotional cruelty which often have life threaten-
ing consequences for example, contracting HIV infection, and other sexually transmit-
ted diseases or can lead to unwanted pregnancies. The situation is particularly acute for 
girls. 
 62. Id. The forced conscription of children to participate in rebel or guerrilla actions led 
ILO to include this practice as one of the worst forms of child labor. The number of 
children under the age of eighteen who have been coerced or induced, either by State 
or by non-state military groups, to take up arms as child soldiers or to serve as porters, 
messengers, cooks and sex slaves is generally thought to be in the range of 300,000, 
with 120,000 of those in Africa alone.  
 63. Id. Many children because of their immediate environment and/or as a form of survival 
get often involved in illicit activities such as producing and trafficking drugs. Exam-
ples of this practice vary from Colombia to Cambodia and from the United States to 
the Russian Federation.  
 64. Convention for Worst Forms of Child Labour, art.3, Jun. 1, 1999, 87 I.L.O 182. 
 65. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION, http://ilo.org/ipec/facts/lang— 
en/index/htm (last visited Sept. 21 2016). 
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cogens among the international community.66 Jus cogens or peremp-
tory norms are generally defined as norms accepted and recognized 
by the international community from which no derogation is al-
lowed67  
They are prevailing norms not because States have decided so, 
but because they have an intrinsically superior character and cannot 
be disposed of through normal inter-state relations thus, binding all 
actors within the international community and potentially creating 
obligations erga omnes applicable to TNCs68 Furthermore, while hu-
man rights treaties that protect children are not self-executing and do 
not support private means of action they do not necessarily have to be 
enforced by states or signatories, “[t]heir existence and near global 
recognition significantly contributes to the creation of universally 
binding customary international law” 69  
 
a. Interpretation of International Human Rights Standards 
Applicable to TNCs 
i. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a legal 
source of direct corporate human rights responsibilities.70   In fact this 
obligation is asserted in its Preamble, which states: “every individual 
and every organ of society.... shall strive… to ensure the observance 
and implementation of human rights and this excludes no one, no 
company, no market, no cyberspace.”71 Article 29 of the UDHR also 
 
 66. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties art. 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. 
 67. See Id. at art. 53.  
 68. Alexander Orakhelashivili, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8, 
(Oxford Univ. Press 2006).  
 69. See Madeleine Grey Bullard, Child Labour Prohibitions are universal, binding and 
obligatory law: The revolving state of customary international law concerning the un-
derpowered child labourer, 24 HOUSTON J. INT’L L. 140, 160 (2001), Two factors 
contribute to customary international law: state practice and opinio juris.Customary in-
ternational law develops over time, evidenced by general patterns of practice and a be-
lief of states that they must act out of their legal or moral obligation, which can be 
translated in treaties, declarations, international agreements and judiciary practice. 
 70. G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). [here-
inafter “UDHR Res.”]. 
 71. Louis Henkin, Keynote Address: the Universal Declaration at 50 and the challenge of 
global Markets. 1, BROOK. J. INT’LL. 17, 25 (1999). 
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denotes that: “[e]veryone [including TNCs] has duties to the commu-
nity and ‘any State, group or person should abstain from acts or activ-
ities that can put at stake the rights and freedoms in the Declara-
tion.”72 
These provisions can be interpreted as conferring direct obliga-
tions on non-state actors, such as TNCs, to respect children’s rights 
(the negative duty of non-violation), to protect children’s rights (the 
positive duty to prevent the violation of children’s rights by others 
and to fulfill children’s rights (the positive duty to take measures for 
progressive improvement).73   The assumption is that anyone who has 
the power to affect children’s rights must do so without violating or 
undermining them.74   These articles make an important statement 
within the context of the human rights responsibilities of TNCs.75 
 
ii. The Slavery Conventions 
The Slavery Convention of 1926 is “considered to be the first 
modern international treaty for the protection of human rights.”76 In 
this convention, slavery is referred to as “chattel slavery” which falls 
within the traditional meaning of slavery where people were treated 
like livestock and as tradable commodities.77 Even though the con-
vention does not mention child labor, it makes a statement on both on 
the repugnant nature of slavery and how state parties must take all the 
necessary measures to stop all forms of slavery.78  
Later, the Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slav-
ery, the Slave Trade and Practices Similar to Slavery of 1958 were 
added to the first convention by expanding the definition of slavery, 
prohibiting slavery and urging states to eliminate all institutions and 
 
 72. UDHR Res. supra note 70, at art. 29.  
 73. Id.   
 74. Rogers Dhliwayo, Understanding the obligations of non -state actors in the realization 
of children’s rights, Institute for Democracy in Africa 9, 1- 44 (Mar. 2007). 
 75. Id.  
 76. Franzika Humbert, THE CHALLENGE OF CHILD LABOUR IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW, 16 (Cambridge Univ. Press ed. 2009). 
 77. Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, art. 1, Sept. 25, 1926, 60 
L.N.T.S 253.  
 78. Id. at art. 8.  
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practices similar to slavery.79 The practices outlined in Article 
1,particularly debt bondage, highlight the level of dependency of the 
victim in relation to the control of the other person (condition; status, 
disposal) whereby a person is usually economically exploited.80 The 
sense of “ownership and control” is a key to differentiating slavery-
like practices and other human right infringements.  
By inference child labor practices, like debt bondage and the 
hazardous working conditions faced by vulnerable and dependent 
children employed by TNCs in the mining industry in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America and within cocoa farms in West Africa not only 
prevents a child’s physical, psychological and educational develop-
ment but more importantly leads to the economic exploitation of 
children.81   Even Uzbekistan’s government has been considered to be 
a “slave nation” by forcing over 2 million schoolchildren between the 
ages of 10 and 15 to work in cotton fields.82  
Children are highly dependent and easily dominated (or econom-
ically exploited) by their parents. Enterprises, and even governments, 
can led one to assume that “the degree of dependency necessary for 
work to be qualified as a slavery-like practice will be attained in al-
most all cases”83 Child labor as defined by ILO and UNICEF can 
therefore be considered as a contemporary form of slavery.84  Slavery 
(and by extension, an exploitative form of child labor) is a perempto-
ry norm of international law which has been accepted by the interna-
 
 79. Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and Institu-
tions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sep. 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 80. See, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave Trade, and In-
stitutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, art 1, Sep. 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 3. The 
Supplementary Convention actually refers to children in order to avoid “sham adop-
tions.” A “sham adoption” occurs when a family, generally in financial difficulty, 
gives or sells a child to a richer family, nominally to be adopted but in reality, to work 
in the rich family’s household without enjoying either the same statutes or the same 
treatment as ordinary children in the household into which they are adopted. A similar 
practice occurs when children are sent to the households of relatives or others who are 
expected by the child ́s parents to give special attention to their education but in reali-
ty, exploit their labour. Humbert supra note 76,  at 40.  
 81. Clapham supra note 15, at 79.   
 82. Environment Justice Foundation, Slavenation: state sponsored forced child labour in 
Uzbekistan’s cotton fields, ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE FOUNDATION, London, UK, 
http://www.cottoncampaign.org/uploads/3/9/4/7/39474145/2010_ejf_slavenation.pdf  
 83. Humbert, supra note 24, at 41. 
 84. See ILO supra note 42; See Humbert supra note 35.  
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tional community; a norm from which no derogation is allowed and 
therefore, applicable erga omnes to TNC operations.85 As Kinley and 
Tadaki point out, “to the extent that slavery often functions as a 
means of economic oppression for the benefit of private interests, it 
would be clearly appropriate to impose on TNC the obligation to re-
frain from exploiting forced or bonded labor.”86  Similarly, within the 
Supplementary Convention it includes, the forms of exploitative child 
labor, such as industrial and agricultural work, domestic and family 
service, forced and bonded labor, commercial and sexual exploita-
tion, street work, children forced into armed conflicts, children in il-
licit activities and child trafficking.87  
iii. The International Covenants 
Child labor standards are contained in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) as well as the88 International 
Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which 
may be interpreted to apply to businesses.89   Human rights notions 
are now increasingly considered applicable in the private sphere 
through the doctrine of positive obligations. Entering in a new para-
digm shift, the doctrine of positive obligations implies that, TNCs 
should not abstain from exercising their power to protect human 
rights but rather required to exercise such power to respect human 
rights. 
Both the ICCPR and the ICESCR reflect this path and state in 
their respective Preambles the obligations of individuals and their 
“duties to other individuals and to the community to which he [sic] 
belongs is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and ob-
servance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant”. Similar to 
Article 4 of the UDHR and the Supplementary Convention on the 
Abolition of Slavery, the ICCPR (Art. 4; Art.7 and Art.8 (2) and (3)) 
prohibits the economic exploitation of children in the form of slavery 
 
 85. Bullard, supra note 70. 
 86. Kinley and Tadaki, supra note 18. 
 87. See generally, Supplementary Convention on the Abolition of Slavery, the Slave 
Trade, and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sep. 7, 1956, 226 U.N.T.S. 3. 
 88. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S.171. 
 89. See International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, opened for signa-
ture Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.3. 
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and servitude, torture (or cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment) 
from which no derogation is allowed.  
The ICCPR forbids, under Article 8 (1), child labor even though 
it refers to child labor in its traditional form of chattel slavery. Never-
theless, one can deduce that child labor as a slavery-like practice may 
come within the notion of “servitude” (Art. 8 (2)) of the ICCPR. This 
is in line with the Supplementary Convention of 1956 (Art. 7 and Art. 
1) and along with the comments from the drafting process of article 8 
of the ICCPR it seems plausible to refer to slavery-like practices 
when looking at servitude and therefore, child labor. 90   The same 
would hold true under the Forced or Compulsory Labor Convention 
No. 29 and its complementary framework the Abolition of forced La-
bor Convention No 105. The protection of “minor” children by the 
ICCPR, enshrined in Article 24 (1), makes it clear that children have 
the right to positive “measures of protection” by their family, society 
and the state. This stresses the horizontal effect of the provision 
(commonly referred to as “Drittwirkung der Grundrechte”) and the 
protection against abusive child labor. State parties to the Convention 
have the immediate and absolute duty not only to prevent child labor 
from occurring (for example as a result of exploitation from enter-
prises including exploitation by the child’s own parents) but also in-
ter alia to put into action special economic, social and cultural 
measures for the rehabilitation and education of previous child labor-
ers. 
This may also include, not only the enforcement of national 
measures on the prohibition of child labor, but also suitable scrutiny 
 
 90. (Shultz and Castan 2000).  Of relevant notice is that the ICCPR in Article 8 (3) differ-
entiates between “servitude” and “forced labor”. Even though the two types overlap 
they cannot be treated equally as the restrictions on forced or compulsory labor admits 
exceptions and derogations. The main characteristic of forced or compulsory labor is 
involuntariness, whereas slavery and servitude are also barred in case of voluntariness 
(Van Bueran 1995). Though the concepts are not equivalent, slavery like practices do 
contain the elements that constitute forced labor and should be judged within the scope 
of the “forced labor” under Article 8 (3) of the ICCPR. “This view is confirmed by 
other legal authors who have held that Art. 8 (3) lit. a prohibits all forms of forced la-
bor beyond slavery and slavery-like practices, and that the notion of servitude was 
considered to cover systems of forced, compulsory or “corrective” labor. Hence, child 
labor can be said to come within the meaning of forced labor” (Humbert 2009 p. 59). 
In this case the exceptions and exemptions foreseen in Article 8 (3) lit b and c are not 
applicable in the case of child labor since child labor (not tolerable child work) fits 
within the notion of servitude which is restricted under Article 8 (2).  
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of labor practices within private enterprises. For example, Pakistan’s 
government a signatory to the ICCPR, has outlawed in its Constitu-
tion (Art. 11) slavery, forced labor, trafficking and the employment 
of children under the age of fourteen in hazardous work conditions. 
While also including “principles of policy” on free and compulsory 
education and the creation of just and humane work conditions for 
children, a balance of rights between employers and employees and 
the creation of an adequate livelihood for all. Nepal, a country also 
party to the ICCPR, provides jurisdictional measures protecting chil-
dren against cruelty have been incorporated into domestic law, thus 
criminalizing child cruelty.91 Therefore, children’s human rights have 
to be respected by everyone, including TNCs. 
As with the ICCPR, under the ICESR States have an obligation 
to protect the individual rights of children from violations by third 
parties including non-state actors. Under Article 5 (1), the ICESCR 
clearly forbids states as well as other private groups (such as non-sate 
actors) or individuals from engaging in any activity aimed at the de-
struction of rights outlined in the Covenant.92  With regard to the spe-
cial situation of young girls, the ICESCR is requires states  “to pro-
tect [young] women from discrimination.”93 In Uganda, 2.7 million 
children aged 5-15 are employed and, even though education is not 
compulsory, the government has granted funds to allow free school-
ing. However, the percentage of young girls dropping out of school is 
higher than for boys. This high dropout rate may be due to early mar-
riages and employment in informal or full time work for TNCs.94 
The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, a body 
of independent experts who monitor the implementation of the 
ICESCR by its member states, has also highlighted the role of other 
non-state actors (e.g. the World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund) in prioritizing not just economic growth projects but also the 
enjoyment of human rights by children avoiding projects contraven-
 
 91. Jean-François Akandji-Kombe, Positive Obligations under the European Convention 
of Human Rights, Council of Eur., 37 (2007), 
https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommonSearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?docu
mentId=090000168007ff4d.pdf.  
 92.  I CESCR (art. 5 (1)). 
 93. Clapham,infra note 121, at  324. 
 94. Van Hoof infra note 127. 
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ing the Covenant and citing those that involve child labor95 Neverthe-
less, the emphatic duty of the states, direct parties to the treaties, to 
ensure the respect of human rights by businesses, cannot be dis-
missed. 
iv. The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
The problems associated with child labor, in recent times, have 
been aided by the Convention on the Rights of the Child of 1989 
(CRC).96 It aimed to formalize in a Convention children’s rights and - 
the right of children to be protected from economic exploitation97   
It can be argued, however, that the CRC provides relevant 
framework of rights regarding child labor.98 The CRC has the largest 
number of signatories of any Convention. 99 It was also the fastest to 
be implemented, which it did in 1990, just a year after its being 
signed. 
Article 32 of the CRC is one of the main articles where a general 
recognition of the right of children to be protected from economic 
exploitation is enshrined.100   Under the CRC, children have the right 
 
 95. (Art. 22). 
 96. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child is available from: 
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc.htm. 
 97. The protection of children from economic exploitation was first outlined in the Decla-
ration of the Rights of the child of 1924 and later expanded in the Convention of the 
Rights of the Child.  
 98. Rights relevant to the issue of child labor include in particular, Article 32 (protection 
from economic exploitation and child labor), Articles 11 and 35 (combating trafficking 
in children) Article 19 (protection against violence, abuse, neglect and exploitation), 
Article 34 (protection of children from sexual exploitation or abuse) and Article 38 
(setting international standards in relation to children and armed conflict).  
 99. The CRC has to date 140 signatories and 193 parties: 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en.  
 100. Article 32 of the CRC states (emphasis added): 1. States Parties recognize the right of 
the child to be protected from economic exploitation and from performing any work 
that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child’s education, or to be harm-
ful to the child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development. 2. 
States Parties shall take legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to 
ensure the implementation of the present article. To this end, and having regard to the 
relevant provisions of other international instruments, States Parties shall in particular: 
(a) Provide for a minimum age or minimum ages for admission to employment; (b) 
Provide for appropriate regulation of the hours and conditions of employment; (c) Pro-
vide for appropriate penalties or other sanctions to ensure the effective enforcement 
of the present article.  
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to be protected from hazardous work that is likely to impact on the 
child’s “health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social devel-
opment.”101    In this respect the scope of application of Art. 32 (1) is 
wider when compared to Article 10 (3) of the ICESCR as it forbids 
“any work” as opposed to just “work harmful to their morals or 
health or dangerous to life or likely to hamper their normal develop-
ment.” 
The CRC urges States to introduce minimum age legislation; 
taking into consideration the relevant international instruments such 
as International Labor Organization Convention concerning Mini-
mum Age for Admission to Employment Nº 138.102  This is particu-
larly relevant since it mirrors the ILO and UNICEF definition of 
child labor; stating that as labor, which does a child who is under the 
minimum age specified in national and international standards, per-
form.103 
In line of thought with the ICCPR and the ICESCR, Article 32 of 
the CRC similarly allows for the creation of regulation and the in-
spection of enterprises.104 The horizontal effect is visible, as States 
have an obligation to prevent and restrain violations against the right 
to protection from economic exploitation by private entities (namely 
TNCs).105   India, a party to the CRC, has included the prohibition of 
the employment of children below the age of fourteen (14) in any fac-
tory or mine or in any other hazardous work in its Constitution.106   
This is legally enforceable against not only the state but also corpora-
tions.107 Recommendations from the Committee on the Rights of the 
Child are useful here as they specify the actions that non-sate actors 
are expected to take, as well as underline, the necessary monitoring 
mechanisms that should be in place to respect the human rights of 
 
 101. See direct relationship between Article 32 and Articles 24 and 28 of the CRC 
on the right to education and to health (Verheyde 2006; Eide &Eide 2006).  
 102. Iloc Art. 138 
 103. However, the CRC allows for discretionary and somewhat confusing multiple 
standards on the minimum age for the employment of children; this has not 
escaped the attention of critics who allege that the CRC is a repetitive conven-
tion, made up of issues already covered in other treaties (Kern 2000).   
 104. CRC Art. 32.  
 105. Id.  
 106. INDIA CONST. art. 4.  
 107. Justice S. Muralidhar, The Expectations and Challenges of Judicial Enforce-
ment of Social Rights, SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE 4 (2008). 
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children.108  Regarding the right to be protected from economic ex-
ploitation, State parties not only have the duty to pass legislation on 
the hours worked and conditions of the employment, but also to en-
force suitable penalties or other appropriate sanctions on enterprises, 
including TNCs.109 As with the ILO Minimum Age Convention (Art. 
2), the CRC reaffirms the significance between the minimum age for 
admission to employment and compulsory education.110  Education is 
seen as a key to combating poverty and thus child labor (Art. 28).111   
The CRC reiterates the need for a multi-approach strategy where not 
only legal but also administrative, social and educational measures 
are put in place to combat child labor.112   
 In this context, the Committee on the Rights of the Child has 
highlighted the interdependence between children’s civil rights in 
shielding against violations of children’s economic and social 
rights.113   For example, “[t]he obligation on State parties to establish 
an accessible registration birth.114   Art. 7 (1)) is essential because 
without a verifiable record of number and ages, it is impossible to 
plan effectively economic and social rights policies and programs.115  
In addition, an absence of birth documents makes minimum age leg-
islation preventing the economic, social and sexual exploitation of 
child labor impossible to enforce effectively.116   It is with this in 
 
 108. UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General comment no. 5 (2003): General 
measure of implementation of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (arts. 4, 42 
and 44, para. 6), UN Doc. CRC/GC/2003/5, (Nov. 27, 2003), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/4538834f11.html, The Private Sector as Service Pro-
vider and its Role in Implementing Child Rights, (Dec. 11, 2002), 
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/CRC/Discussions/Recommendations/Rec
ommendations2002.pdf.  
 109. Anup Shah, Corporations and Worker’s Rights, GLOBAL ISSUES (May 28, 2006), 
http://www.globalissues.org/article/57/corporations-and- workers-rights. 
 110. International Labour Organization Minimum Age Convention concerning Minimum 
Age for Admission to Employment art. 2  (Jun. 26, 1973). 
 111. International Labour Organization Minimum Age Convention concerning Minimum 
Age for Admission to Employment art. 2,( Jun. 26, 1973.) 
 112. See generally, MIEKE VERHEYDE, ARTICLE 28: THE RIGHT TO EDUCATION,( Maartinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 2006.)  
 113. UN, General Comment No. 7 Implementing Rights in Early Childhood, ¶3, U.N. Doc. 
CRC/C/GC/2005 (Sept. 30, 2005).  
 114. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7 (1)( Nov. 20, 1989.). 
 115. Id.  
 116. GERALDINE VAN BUEREN, COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD: OVERCOMING 
INERTIA IN THIS AGE OF NO ALTERNATIVES, 579, Cambridge University Press (2008). 
BORGES_ARTICLE 1.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/7/17  3:54 PM 
2016- 2017             UB Journal of International Law                Vol. V. No. 1 
 21 
mind that the Committee urged Ethiopia to set up adequate birth reg-
istration infrastructures including mobile structures. 
In addition, states have an obligation to recover and reintegrate 
exploited children to the “maximum of its available resources”.117 As 
within the scope, Covenants states can also rely on international co-
operation mechanisms to fulfill their obligations under CRC (Art 
23(4); Art. 28 (3); Art. 39) in pursuing the best interests of the child 
(Art. 3 (1)).118 
v. The ILO Conventions 
The relevance of the Forced Labor Convention (FLC) Nº 29 
from 1930 and its counterpart the Forced Labor convention Nº 105 of 
1957 in the context of child labor is calling for an immediate eradica-
tion of forced or compulsory labor without enabling state parties to 
resort to intermediary provisions.119  
Article 2 of the FLC tries to define the term “forced or compul-
sory labor.”120  Over the years, reports of exploitative forms of child 
labor in situations from domestic service to bonded labor have ex-
posed vulnerable children to the so-called “contemporary forms of 
forced labor”.121   Slavery and slavery-like practices have also been 
equated to forced labor that has gained recognition as a peremptory 
norm in international law. 122  Since child labor has been found to be 
 
 117. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 2 (1) (Nov. 20, 1989) 
 118. Id. at art. 3 (1). 
 119. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, Preamble (Jun. 28, 1930). 
 120. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, art. 2 (1), (Jun. 28, 1930) (A 
two-tier element of coercion (“all work or service which is enacted from any person 
under the menace of any penalty”) and involuntariness (“for which the said person has 
not offered himself voluntary”) composes the meaning of the concept of “forced or 
compulsory labour” within the convention. In the case of children they are rarely in the 
position of giving their consent as they are dependent de facto e de iure on their par-
ents. In line with Article 3 and the principle of best interests of the child contained in 
CRC “the consent of the parents cannot be deemed sufficient in cases of exploitative 
child labour where the child does not give its consent” (Humbert, 2009 at84). The el-
ement of coercion and dependency between a child and its masters also leads one to 
conclude that economic exploitation of children is also included within the provisions 
of the Forced Labour Convention). 
 121. See, ILO Director-General, Stopping Forced Labour: Global Report under the Follow-
up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, (May 8, 
2001).  
 122. Andrew Clapham, Human rights obligations of non-state actors in conflict situations, 
88 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS, 863 (2006). 
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a slavery-like practice, not only under the Supplementary Convention 
on Slavery, but also within the meaning of servitude or forced labor 
in the ICCPR (Art. 8 (2)); the same would hold true under the Forced 
or Compulsory Labor Convention Nº29.123  
The obligations of the Convention have a horizontal effect “to 
private individuals, companies or associations” (Art. 4 and 5) oblig-
ing state parties to suppress forced or compulsory labor with adequate 
national measures and enforce appropriate penal sanctions.124  How-
ever, the lack of appropriate means or experience by government may 
hamper the eradication of child labor.125   In Angola, many children 
are involved in prostitution, domestic and hazardous labor.126  Law 
enforcement is weak and inspections are rare. Plus, more than thirty 
percent of children ages 5-14 are working allowing TNCs to operate 
on discretionary grounds.127  
The Convention on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Nº 182 of 
1999 and its accompanying Recommendation 190 is a reflection of 
the growing international consensus on the urgent need to fight 
against the worst forms of child labor gaining jus cogens status.128  
The convention indicates which types of child labor exploitation 
 
 123. See, ILO, A Global Alliance Against Forced Labour: Global Report under the Follow-
up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and rights at Work 2005, (2005), 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_norm/—-
declaration/documents/publication/wcms_081882.pdf, (The Convention does seem to 
include exemptions i.e. forms of work that do not constitute “forced or compulsory” 
labour (Art. 2 (2) lit. a-e). However, child labour as a contemporary form of slavery in 
Article 8 (2) of the ICCPR cannot be subject to exemptions neither under Article 8 (3) 
lit. b and c of the ICCPR nor by majority under Article 2 (2) of the ILO Convention 
concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour this would outwit the absolute prohibition 
of slavery-like practices of Art. 8 (2) and deteriorate the coherence of international 
law).  
 124. Convention concerning Forced or Compulsory Labour, art. 25 (Jun. 28, 1930). 
 125. See generally, International Labour Organization, Effective abolition of child labour, 
http://www.ilo.org/declaration/principles/abolitionofchildlabour/lang—en/index.htm 
(last visited, Sept. 19, 2016). 
 126. See, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, 2013 FINDINGS ON THE WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR 
(2013), https://www.dol.gov/ilab/reports/child-labor/findings/2013TDA/angola.pdf.  
 127. Heidi van Hoof, The European Commission’s commitment to Education & to the elim-
ination of Child Labour, ALLIANCE 2015 STOP CHILD LABOUR CAMPAIGN, Nov. 9, 
2007, http://www.indianet.nl/pdf/eucommitment.pdf. 
 128. Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labour, Preamble (Jun. 17, 1999). 
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states should prioritize. 129  Thus, defining the worst forms of child 
labor and reaffirming that these types of work are not mutually exclu-
sive and can fall within the scope of one or more categories.130  “It 
underscores protection from child labor and its worst forms as a hu-
man and development issue.”131 
States have the possibility to determine which types of activities 
constitute hazardous work, but only in consultation with workers un-
ions and workers themselves and must take into account international 
standards. 132  Recommendation Nº 190 on the Worst Forms of Child 
Labor serves as a useful guide. States also have an obligation to take 
all the necessary measures to prohibit child labor.133  The grounds for 
the Convention establishes that categories of child labor that cannot 
be accepted and consequently cannot be subjected to progressive abo-
lition.  
Thus, states are obliged to take not only immediate, but also 
time-bound measures.134  These include penal or other necessary 
 
 129. Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labour, art. 3 (Jun. 17, 1999). 
 130. Yaa Yeboah & Frank Panford, Eliminating the worst forms of child labour under 
Time-Bound Programmes: Guidelines for strengthening legislation, enforcement and 
overall legal framework, ILO, 4, (2003) http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-
africa/documents/meetingdocument/wcms_228974.pdf.  
 131. Id. , (Contrary to the Minimum Age Convention, Convention N º 182 neither forbids 
light work under the age of thirteen (or twelve) nor work that interferes with compul-
sory schooling. Whilst the Minimum Age Convention refers to all three categories of 
child labour that ought to be abolished Convention Nº 182 centres itself in more detail 
on the two later categories - hazardous work and unconditional worst forms of child 
labour [child slavery, trafficking, debt bondage, forced recruitment into armed con-
flicts prostitutions, illicit activities and pornography] for which it does not provide ex-
ceptions). 
 132. ILO, Recommendation 190: Recommendation Concerning the Prohibition and Imme-
diate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, (Jun.  17, 1999), 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/com-chir.htm.  
 133. ILO, Recommendation 190: Recommendation Concerning the Prohibition and Imme-
diate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, (Jun.  17, 1999), 
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc87/com-chir.htm.  
 134. See generally Yaa Yeaboah & Frank Panford, ELIMINATING the WORST FORMS of 
CHILD LABOUR UNDERTIME-BOUND PROGRAMMES: GUIDELINES For STRENGTHENING 
LEGISLATION, ENFORCEMENT and OVERALL LEGAL FRAMEWORK, at 5, Geneva: Int’l 
Labour Office (2003) (The International Programme on the Elimination of Child La-
bour established by ILO in 1992 has developed the Time-Bound Programme approach 
“[i]s a government-led effort that is designed to bring to bear the expertise of all rele-
vant ministries and other actors within a single unified framework. The result should 
be massive reduction or complete elimination of selected worst forms of child labour 
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sanctions, (for actors such as TNCs) and rehabilitation and reintegra-
tion measures for former child laborers (Art. 7).135  To achieve this, 
states should “design and implement programs of action to eliminate 
as a priority the worst forms of child labor” (Art.5; Art.6) and support 
each other via international cooperation and assistance programs 
(Art.8), which may include the contribution of TNCs.136 Going to the 
“root cause” of child labor and fulfilling the victim’s needs highlights 
the value that education is given within the Convention (Art. 7 (2); 
lit. c)).137 
 
b. Direct Applicability of International Human Right 
Standards to TNCs 
Since the 1970s, a number of voluntary initiatives have been 
formulated by intergovernmental organizations aimed at directly reg-
ulating TNC activities.138  A cursory analysis of the various instru-
ments, notably of the OECD Guidelines, the ILO Tripartite Declara-
tion and other UN initiatives is in order as they directly impose 
obligations to TNCs to combating child labor.139 
i. The OECD Guidelines 
The OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, revised in 
2011140, aim at reinforcing private efforts to delineate and put into ac-
tion responsible corporate conduct, wherever they operate, including 
the effective elimination of child labor.141  The updated Guidelines 
include new recommendations on human rights abuses and corporate 
 
within a specific time frame. It incorporates measures that prevent children from en-
gaging in activities identified as “worst forms” by addressing the root causes and tar-
gets the withdrawal and rehabilitation of children who are already engaged in such ac-
tivities”).  
 135. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of 
the Worst Forms of Child Labour, art. 7, June. 17, 1999, ILO No. 182.  
 136. Id. at art. 7. 
 137. Supra note 134. 
 138. David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, infra note 48. 
 139. Id.  
 140. Organization for Economic co-operation and development, OECD, Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises (2011), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf.  
 141. Id.  
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responsibility for their supply chains.142   Since guidelines are volun-
tary and not legally binding, they merely recommend enterprises to 
respect the human rights, not only in their dealings with employees, 
but also with respect to others affected by their activities, in a manner 
that is consistent with the host government’s international obligations 
and commitments.  
Specifically, with regards to child labor the Guidelines recom-
mend that enterprises agree to act within the “framework of applica-
ble law” to effectively eradicate the problem.  Within the Guidelines, 
there is no specific reference to the relevant aforementioned ILO 
Conventions to tackle child labor (ILO Conventions Nº138 and 182) 
but the fact that they mention the UDHR is worth highlighting. Even 
though guidelines are not meant to replace national law and regula-
tion, the Preface of the Guidelines does mention the ILO Declaration 
on Fundamental Rights and Principles at Work.143  
Because ILO Conventions Nº138 and Nº182 are contained in the 
ILO Declaration, it can be presumed that these Conventions will be 
form a basis when applying the guidelines. Governments adhering to 
the guidelines are requested to set up National Contact Points (NCP) 
not only to promote, but also to resolve disputes that may occur from 
the guidelines. However, the NPC has no authority to enforce the 
guidelines.144  
All interested parties may bring claims before the National Con-
tact Points for breach of the guidelines by enterprises. This path has 
been cleverly used by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) re-
garding the abusive behavior of TNC such as in the mining industry 
in resettlement areas in Zambia and in the footwear industry against 
Adidas on child labor practices in India.145 
ii. The ILO Tripartite Declaration 
The 1977 ILO Tripartite Declaration of the Principles concerning 
Multinational Enterprises (revised in 2000 and 2006) is aimed at a 
 
 142. Id.  
 143. Id. at 37.  
 144. Sarah Joseph, SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL 
ANDCOMPARATIVE LAW,  618 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008).  
 145. Id.  
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wider group of actors than the OECD Guidelines.146 In addition to en-
terprises working in their territories (including TNC), the Declaration 
addresses governments, member states, employers, and workers or-
ganizations to adopt adequate social policies.147  The ILO Tripartite 
Declaration pushes state not only to respect the UDHR and its related 
Covenants, but also to ensure the effective abolition of child labor 
explicitly referring to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles 
and Rights at Work and the ILO Convention Nº182 on the elimina-
tion of worst forms of child labor and to respect the minimum age for 
admission to employment portrayed in ILO Convention Nº 138. 
Thus, “the Declaration does provide material evidence that interna-
tional labor law regime has come to include human rights obligations 
for national and multinational enterprises.”  
Like the OECD Guidelines, the ILO Tripartite Declaration is not 
legally binding and though both provide for complaints mechanisms 
aimed at holding enterprises responsible for violations of work-
ers/children rights, judicial or quasi-judicial bodies do not take up 
their enforcement measures.148 Their roles are rather limited to clari-
fication of the interpretation of the instruments.149 
iii. The UN Global Compact 
Another international soft-law proposal analogous to an interna-
tional code of conduct is the 1999 UN Global Compact.150  The com-
pact contains ten nucleus principles on social and environmental af-
fairs including inter alia the effective abolition of child labor 
(Principle 5) both via adequate individual business practices and by 
 
 146. Organization for Economic CO-operation and development, OECD, Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises, at 37, (2011), 
http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf.  
 147. International Labour Organization, TRIPARTITE DECLARATION of PRINCIPLES 
CONCERNING MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES and SOCIAL POLICY, 
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/—-ed_emp/—-emp_ent/—-
multi/documents/publication/wcms_094386.pdf (2006).  
 148. David Kinley, Junko Tadaki, FROM TALK to WALK: The EMERGENCE of HUMAN RIGHTS 
RESPONSIBILITIES for CORPORATIONS at INTERNATIONAL LAW, 44(4) VIRGINIA JOURNAL of 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 950 (2003-04).  
 149. Id.  
 150. U.N. Global Impact, The TEN PRINCIPLES of the UN GlOBAL IMPACT, 
HTTPS://WWW.UNGLOBALCOMPACT.ORG/WHAT-IS-GC/MISSION/PRINCIPLES.  
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sustaining corresponding public policy proposals.151  The enterprises 
that are members to the Global Compact are requested to implement 
the principles and circulate the progress made on the UN Global 
Compact website where civil society organizations may react to these 
publications.152 The UN Global Compact (and its credibility) has been 
the target of criticism over the years for its failure to monitor and ver-
ify businesses’ activities in particular for violations against human 
rights. In fact, TNCs no longer enjoy the signatory status of the Glob-
al Compact per se. To enhance its credibility, the UN Global Com-
pact enacted a complaints mechanism (directed to the Global Com-
pacts Office) for abuses made by an enterprise adhering to the Global 
Compacts aims and principles.153   If a company declines to dialogue 
on a certain issue, it will be labeled as “non-communicating” and au-
tomatically eradicated from the UN Global Compact list of partici-
pants.154 
 
iv.  The UN Norms 
The UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of 
Human Rights adopted in 2003 a resolution that enraptured the 
“Norms on responsibility of Transnational Corporations and other 
Businesses Enterprises with regard to Human Rights,(hereinafter 
“UN Norms”).155   Its innovation directly establishes human rights 
obligations to TNCs and other enterprises within their “sphere of in-
fluence”. Similarly to other international instruments, it directly as-
serts the application of the UDHR and other relevant outlined legal 
 
 151. U.N. Global Impact, The TEN PRINCIPLES of the UN GlOBAL IMPACT, PRINCIPLE 5 
(1999), HTTPS://WWW.UNGLOBALCOMPACT.ORG/WHAT-IS-GC/MISSION/PRINCIPLES.  
 152. U.N. Global Impact, The Ten Principles of the UN Global Impact, (1999), 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles.  
 153. U. N. Glob. Compact, Grievance Mechanism for Business and Human Rights, 
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/library/631 (last visited September 21, 2016). 
 154. Id.  
 155. The UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights is a body 
created to act as a” think-tank” to assist the UN Commission on Human Rights [since 
2006 the Human Rights Council] (an inter-governmental body of fifty-three member 
states of the United Nations). Its twenty-six members are elected as independent ex-
perts by the inter-governmental Commission on Human Rights” (Clapham 2006 p. 
225-226). The 2003 Norms on Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and other 
Businesses Enterprises with regard to Human Rights are available from: 
http://www.unhchr.ch/huridocda/huridoca.nsf/(Symbol)/E.CN.4.Sub.2.2003.12.Rev.2.
En.  
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instruments to corporate activity. This includes the protection of chil-
dren from economic exploitation prohibited in various international 
treaties.156 TNCs are expected to internally comply with these norms 
and periodically report on the initiatives taken to implement them. In 
contrast with previous OECD and ILO texts, it attempts to define the 
meaning of TNCs (Para. 20).157 
Not underrating the major role of states, the UN Norms are vi-
sionary as they recognize the power of TNCs and inculcates them 
“the obligation to promote, secure fulfillment of, respect, ensure re-
spect of and protect human rights recognized in international law as 
well as national law, including the rights and interests of indigenous 
groups and other vulnerable groups” [for instance children].158 The 
UN Norms demand that TNCs “shall respect economic, social and 
cultural rights as well as civil and political rights and contribute to 
their realization” suggesting a form of horizontal legal obligations (of 
respecting and contributing just like states) towards citizens who are 
under their sphere of influence. 159  While there has been much reluc-
tance within the business and international communities towards their 
acceptance and their adoption has ultimately failed, the UN Norms 
establish a relevant embryonic legal framework to impose human 
rights obligations onto TNCs.160 
 
v. The 2011 Guiding Principles on Businesses and Human Rights – a 
remedial legal synthesis? 
The 2011 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
submitted to the Human Rights Council in June 2011 represent a re-
medial legal synthesis of the on-going efforts to bring human rights 
to bear on TNCs. Remedial, as the Guiding Principles “will not bring 
human rights challenges to an end.   Thus, it will mark the end of the 
 
 156. UDHR.  
 157. (Para. 20) (Clapham 2006.  
 158. (Para.1 
 159. Para 12.  
 160. See 2008 Report from the Human Rights Council prepared by John Ruggie “Protect, 
Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights” highlighting the 
role of the state to protect people from corporate human right abuses ditching the idea 
for direct regulation of companies under the Norms.  Available from: 
http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-report-7-Apr-2008.pdf  (Kinley et al 
2007) 
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beginning: by establishing a common global platform for action, on 
which cumulative progress can be built, step-by-step, without fore-
closing any other promising longer-term developments”161 The prin-
ciples do not outline a framework for the future but rely on the 
goodwill of companies and states. There are no deadlines—n o re-
view of progress within the instrument.   A legal synthesis, because 
the thirty one Guiding Principles aim at bringing existing standards 
and practices into a comprehensive and systematic framework and 
bridging the current gaps by offering operationalized solutions.162  
The systematic framework is based on a three pillar based approach 
of Protect, Respect and Remedy. 
Despite criticisms of being too weak as they do not, for example, 
further elaborate on the extraterritorial obligation of the duty to pro-
tect, the Guiding Principles emphasize the role of TNCs to respect 
human rights of specific groups, including children and the need to 
take into account additional standards (these may include the CRC 
and the overarching child labor legal framework).163  In addition, it 
emphasizes the mainstreaming of human rights, especially the reali-
zation of children’s rights, into corporate responsibility actions as 
TNCs should not only avoid but address the infringement of human 
rights where involved. In this context, TNCs may well “undertake 
other commitments or activities to support and promote human rights, 
which may contribute to the enjoyment of human [and children’s] 
rights.”164  These commitments should include carrying out human 
rights impact assessments (“human rights due diligence”) and con-
tributing to the child’s educational development wherever they oper-
ate.165 
c.  Self-Regulation of TNCs 
Since the 1990’s within the “context of debates over globaliza-
tion of capital and the resurgence of sweatshops and child labor-
focused largely, though not exclusively on brand conscious firms in 
the apparel industry (e.g. Nike, the Gap, etc.)”,  there has been a trend 
among TNCs of adopting their own voluntary codes of conduct 
 
 161. Guiding Principles 2011 Introduction at para. 13. 
 162. Guiding Principles 2011 Introduction at para. 14. 
 163. Guiding Principles 2011 at princ. 12 and Commentary para. 3.  
 164. Guiding Principles 2011 at princ. 11 and Commentary para.3. 
 165. Supra princ 7 & 10.  
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which contain certain standards of behavior in relation to many areas 
including respect for labor and human rights.166  “For example, these 
codes can set minimum standards for the company’s own behavior, 
as well as standards for the types of countries the company will be 
willing to invest in, and standards for the behavior of acceptable 
business partners.” 167   The majority of codes of conduct are pro-
duced by the textile, clothing and footwear industry. It is in these la-
bor-intensive industries where reference to child labor in codes of 
conduct is most evident.168  
The aim of adopting codes of conduct is to protect a company’s 
brand, image and reputation ensuring the end that consumers do not 
boycott their products or services169   This voluntary approach can al-
so be seen as a way to limit the regulatory and monitoring action of 
governments.  
In fact,  
 
“(...) firms initially developed codes of conduct to 
shield themselves from several types of external pres-
sures. In at least some instances, they then used their 
engagement in voluntary efforts as a way to ward off 
further government intervention.”170  
 
There are a multitude of various types of codes of conduct some 
unilaterally adopted (for instance with Gap, Nike, Disney, etc.) others 
industry lead (for example, the Worldwide Responsible Apparel Pro-
duction Principles; the World Federation of Sporting Goods Industry 
code; The International Cocoa Initiative, etc.) and some codes of 
 
 166. (Bartley 2005 p. 219) 
 167. Joseph 2000 p. 82 
 168. A study carried out by the International Organization of Employers and cited in Ur-
minsky (2001) analysed 258 codes of conduct addressing labour practices, including 
forced or child labour and determined that the sector with the highest number of codes 
of conduct was the textile, garment and footwear industry with 62 codes. Among the 
codes studied only 47 percent mentioned the issue of child labour. Other labour inten-
sive sectors referring to the issue of child labour include the food and beverage indus-
try and forestry and construction sectors. Urminsky 2001; Martin-Ortega and Wallace 
2005). 
 169. (Alston 2005). It is also to some extent the result of the “corporate governance debate” 
balancing of interest of all stakeholders i.e. those that may be affected by TNCs ac-
tions (suppliers, employees, customers, investors, creditors but also the local popula-
tion)  
 170. (Bartley 2005 p. 227). 
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conduct are the product of multi stakeholder negotiations, such as: 
SA8000; The Ethical Trading Initiative; The Clean Codes Campaign, 
etc.171 
According to a study carried out by the World Bank in 2003, 
there were 1,000 existing company codes.   “Among the “leadership” 
firms [apparel, footwear and light manufacturing sector] examined, 
there appears to be an emerging trend that the minimum age for child 
labor must be at least 15, or the age for completing compulsory edu-
cation, whichever is greater.   Although there is no discrepancy in the 
commitment of all the codes of conduct to eradicate the use of child 
labor, there are variances among codes, which set the minimum age 
for child labor at anywhere between 14 and 18. 172   [T]he emerging 
trends in child labor conform to ILO Minimum Age Convention, No. 
138 and the Worst Forms of Child Labor Convention, No. 182, in 
that minimum age is the greater of 15 (or 14 in certain countries), or 
the age for completing local compulsory education.173 
The ILO provides for far more extensive protections for children 
than those mandated in most codes, such as protecting children from 
work that is hazardous or would “harm health”.174   Additionally, few 
firms comply with such recommendations as ILO Recommendation 
No. 146, which provides that for any child found performing labor, 
the firm must enable them to attend school, and will not hire them 
during school hours.” 175 
 
v. The Challenges to Enforcement of Child Labor Standards 
The enforcement of child labor standards puts emphasis on the 
states, as the main parties to the treaties and as the main drivers to re-
spect, fulfill, promote and protect children from exploitative forms of 
child labor. However, extended obligations are evidently imposed on 
TNCs in the majority of child labor standards instruments (treaty and 
non-treaty based). These instruments reflect general recommended 
behavior of customary nature implying that TNCs should not only re-
 
 171. SA8000; The Ethical Trading Initiative; The Clean Codes Campaign, etc. 
 172. Supra note 135.  
 173. Supra note 135. 
 174. Supra note 135.  
 175. Worldbank  7-8 (2003).   
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spect the human rights of children, but should also to take steps to re-
alize children’s rights and abolish child labor.  
 The strengths and weaknesses of UN instruments in safeguard-
ing children from exploitation are clearly seen in the immediate ap-
plicability of civil and political rights (ICCPR) and the progressive 
realization of economic and social rights (ICESCR) making the latter 
limited in their success due to the state’s “available resources”.176   
This means that the developed world is in a better economic position 
to implement the CRC and combat child labor via a “multi-approach 
strategy” which translates into enacting legislative measures to pun-
ish any abusive behavior by TNCs as well as education, penal, health, 
labor rehabilitation measures and programs than the developing 
world is, where the problem of child labor is more acute.177 However, 
it should be mentioned that international aid could help in this pro-
cess. The CRC, while it disposes of monitoring and collection of in-
formation provisions, lacks an enforcement mechanism.178   Despite 
being one of the most ratified conventions, more than one third of the 
ratifying countries have lodged reservations asking for exemptions. 
Among are Islamic countries that have indicated the CRC will be in-
terpreted in harmony with Islamic Law and values which could easily 
undermine the object and rationale of the legal instrument.179  Its fail-
ure to set minimum age standards for employment; the usage of the 
term “appropriate” to express the conditions of work and working 
time regulations; and its fines for violations, are all deficiencies that 
make the CRC document somewhat vague and inefficient.180  
Furthermore, enforcing protection against the economic exploita-
tion of children may require different and sometimes overlapping 
measures in developed and developing states.   In developed states, 
 
 176. Danwood Mzikenge Chirwa, In search of philosophical justifications and suitable 
models for the horizontal application of human rights, 8 Afr. Hum. Rts. L.J., 294, 296-
97 (2008) (citing H. STEINER & P. ALSTON, INT’ HUM. RTS. IN CONTEXT: LAW, 
POLITICS, MORALS 361-63 (3d ed. 2008). 
 177. Hyder Kamran, Value Creation Through Corporate Social Responsibility in Develop-
ing Countries: A Case Study of Proctor & Gamble Pakistan, 3 INT’LL J. OF BUS. 
RESEARCH & MGMT., 286 (2012). 
 178. Eric Engle, The Convention of the Rights of the Child, 29 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 809, 793-
819 (2011). 
 179. Frederick B. Jonassen, A Baby-Step to Global Labor Reform: Corporate Codes of 
Conduct and the Child, 17 MINN. J. INT’L L. 16, 17-58 (2008). 
 180. Id.  
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the problem of child labor is due to the inadequate protection and in-
spectorate scrutiny of children that conciliate work with education in 
the agriculture or service sectors).181   In the developing world, the 
most effective way to reduce children under the age of 12 from work-
ing is to provide access to primary education and enable more flexi-
ble working arrangements.182  
The role of the ILO and of International Program for the elimina-
tion of Child Labor in combating child labor cannot be discarded. 
The issue of the exploitation of child labor has been taken as a prima-
ry matter considered in Conventions Nº 138 and Nº 182.183   Despite 
their efforts, the conventions have slowly gained the support of influ-
ential states reflecting that governments are willing to sacrifice chil-
dren’s human rights over economic gain. 
Support from developing countries with regard to the minimum 
age convention has also been slow due to consideration of age differ-
entials portrayed in the Convention between the developed and de-
veloping world is deficient. “To date, less than 60% of ILO member 
countries have ratified all of the ILO core labor conventions, among 
which is the effective abolition of child labor.”184  Unfortunately, ILO 
also lacks the power to enforce its conventions resorting primarily to 
dialogue, moral persuasion and technical assistance.185 Furthermore, 
it does not have the authority to grant remedies/compensation to in-
jured child laborers. 
In addition, much of the work carried out by children is in the 
“informal” sector where not only is it impossible to acquire adequate 
and precise statistics of the extent of the illegality but also to enforce 
child labor standards adequately.186 For example, ILO Recommenda-
tion 146 highlights that children should be issued documents or li-
censes specifying their work eligibility; however, in practice it is 
 
 181. Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child, 266 (1998). 
 182. G.J.H. van Hoof, The Legal Nature of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: a Rebut-
tal to Some Traditional Views, The Right to Food, 97 (2007). 
 183. Minimum Age Convention, Jun. 26, 1973, 58 ILO 138.  
 184. N. Jaffe & J. Weiss, The Self-Regulating Corporation: How Corporate Codes can save 
our Children. FORDHAM J.. & FIN. L., 893-922 (2006).  
 185. KIMBERLY A. ELLIOTT & RICHARD B. FREEMAN, CAN LABOR STANDARDS IMPROVE 
UNDER GLOBALIZATION, 93 (2003).  
 186. Report of the rapid assessment on: Child Labour in the Urban Informal Sector in three 
governorates of Jordan (Amman, Mafraq and Irbid), International Labour Organisation 
(ILO) 15 (2014). 
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nearly impossible to effectively supervise migrant children, children 
working on the streets or those engaged in itinerant jobs.187   There 
are also inconsistencies by employers and lack of supervision by 
states in the maintenance of company records of the names and ages 
of children they employ limiting the enforcement of the minimum 
age convention provisions.188  Labor inspection services overseeing 
the operations of TNCs are also deemed to have a lack of human re-
sources, and expertise, and low salaries; additionally, they are gener-
ally uncoordinated and plagued by corruption.189 
 
vi. Paving the Way for a Renewed International Legal 
Framework for TNCs to Realize Children’s Rights? 
i. Binding international regulation 
In the short-term, a coordinated approached to the multiplicity of 
human rights standards applicable to TNCs, in the context of child 
labor, might be the wisest thing to do to protect children’s rights and 
guide TNCs in their daily operations. Even though the 2011 Guiding 
Principles on Businesses and Human Rights may represent a “legal 
synthesis” the lack of an adequate framework for the future and re-
view mechanisms tears downs the potential of such document, leav-
ing space for further legal uncertainties.190   
 In the long-term, the establishment of a comprehensive interna-
tional jurisdictional framework directly applicable to TNCs activities 
would be beneficial in delimiting their responsibilities and in tackling 
exploitative child labor practices.   This could be embodied in a new 
treaty regime or in a “hybrid instrument” directed at TNCs while 
 
 187. Minimum Age Recommendation, Jun. 26, 1973, 58 ILO 146. 
 188. Geraldine Van Bueren, The International Law on the Rights of the Child, 266 (1998). 
 189. Manuel Antonio Alhambra & Beryl ter Haar & Attila Kun, Independent Monitoring of 
Private Transnational Regulation of Labour Standards: A Feasible Proposition for a 
“Transnational Labour Inspectorate” System, (2013)http://ilera-
eu-
rope2013.eu/uploads/paper/attachment/267/2013_06_01_TLI_Garcia_Haar_Kun.pdf.  
 190. Office of the High Comm’r for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on Business and 
Human Rights, U. N. Human Rights (2011). 
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keeping major executive duties within the remit of states. 191  It could 
also result in creating obligations for TNCs under an additional Pro-
tocol to the CRC with adequate complaint mechanisms192  
Alternatively, a legal regime or code of international corporate 
responsibility could be developed where a recognized international 
coordinating institution (for example, ILO or UN Human Rights 
Council) would have the power to ensure broad agreement of the 
content of the norms and provide an archetype for their implementa-
tion. This entity would have the power to publicly investigate and 
condemn abusive conduct by TNCs. This would help change the be-
havior of TNC operating abroad that employ child labor and could 
have a disastrous economic impact on them. 
Following from this, shortcomings of national legislation, the 
problem of state accountability and complicity and the limitations of 
criminal accountability could be tackled. Furthermore, direct interna-
tional regulation would also provide uniform interpretation of the 
human rights obligations of TNCs and deter corporations from being 
complicit with corrupt or fragile states creating a paradigm shift from 
the traditional state-centric framework of international law.193  
Even though, these may seem like radical approaches, which 
would involve a completely new international human rights law 
framework, it is not impossible for TNCs. Despite the failure of the 
UN Norms and the limitation of enforcement mechanisms of other 
legal standards directly imposing obligations on TNCs what can be 
learnt from these voluntary initiatives (or “soft law approaches”) rep-
resents a leap forward and a “model treaty” in setting, “universal, 
broad-based and authoritative” child labor human right standards for 
 
 191. David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J INT’L L., 931-1002 
(2003).  
 192. One could foresee the advantages of the direct individual complaints mechanism (ac-
cess to justice at the international level) now appearing under the Committee on the 
Rights of the Child under the third optional protocol, which will allow individual chil-
dren to submit complaints regarding specific violations of their rights under the Con-
vention and its first two optional protocols which was previously missing. Available 
from: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/.  
 193. Sarah Joseph, Human Rights Treaties,  SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING 
TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW , 618 (2008). 
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TNCs both at the national and international level.194 Refuting the idea 
that the impact of international law might be diluted by soft law 
standards regarding the activities of TNCs. 
In point of fact, “companies are likely to support [binding] regu-
lation when it supports its business strategy or capitalizes on areas 
that they have invested.”195 One cannot let market forces behind dis-
guised unenforceable corporate codes determine the human rights re-
sponsibilities of TNCs.196 Protection of children in the workplace 
could be enhanced if these current soft-law mechanisms obtain their 
legitimacy under international law.197 
ii. The added value of other relevant non-state actors 
The role of other non-state actors such as NGOs, educational and 
religious organizations, the media, multilateral organizations like the 
World Bank (WB), the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) cannot be discarded in the context of a 
renewed legal framework for TNCs.198 All have the potential to con-
tribute towards enforcing TNCs’ observance of human rights stand-
ards and ending child labor. 
The relevance of civil society, individuals and consumer pres-
sure, global aid and trade institutions on TNCs, also have, the capaci-
ty to directly affect TNCs’ earnings by ensuring that a TNC has a 
 
 194. D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Pri-
vate Implications of Public International Law, 6 Human Rights Law Review, 447,  493 
(2006).  
 195. CLAIRE FAUSET, WHAT’S WRONG WITH CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY? 
CORPORATE WATCH CSR REPORT 2006 14 (2006) 
https://corporatewatch.org/publications/2006/whats-wrong-corporate-social-
responsibility.  
 196. Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility?, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY Ch. 8, 207-237 (Doreen 
McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007) 
(calling “meta-regulation” to the large number of hard and soft law approaches each 
regulating one another as part of the so-called “contemporary corporate governance”).  
 197. Olga Martin-Ortega & Rebecca M.M. Wallace, The interaction between corporate 
codes of conduct and international law: a study of women and children in the textile 
industry, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE LEGAL RESPONSIBILITY 302-18 
(Stephen Tully, ed., Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publ’g Ltdd 2005). 
 198. Christine Parker, Meta-Regulation: Legal Accountability for Corporate Social Re-
sponsibility?, in THE NEW CORPORATE ACCOUNTABILITY Ch. 8, 207-37 (Doreen 
McBarnet, Aurora Voiculescu & Tom Campbell, eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2007). 
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good human rights record.199  Going beyond the conceptual wrangling 
over whether or not they should act as an enforcement agency for in-
ternational and national child labor law standards the fact remains 
that, they have the capacity of being a powerful regulator in the 
“global foreign investment flows” of TNC activities due to their close 
relationship with private enterprises, particularly in developing coun-
tries. 
For example, a key WB institution, the International Finance 
Corporation that provides businesses with loans to execute develop-
ment projects normally in partnership with host states, requires cor-
porations to conduct their operations in an “environmental, social and 
responsible manner” this includes the prohibition of forced or haz-
ardous child labor. Non- compliance with these policies may put at 
stake the loan and implementation of the project.  Trade sanctions al-
so have the potential to deter TNCs from committing human right 
abuses. “For example, if a product were made by child or forced la-
bor, states that ban imports produced by child labor might rely on a 
ILO standard to argue in favor of trade restriction.” 200  Such argu-
ments would attach current international child labor standards to 
trade. 
Whether or not free trade imperative versus human rights are 
compatible per se is beyond the scope of this work nevertheless, it 
might be claimed that “in light of the contemporary concerns of the 
community of nations” a “moral argument” exists under Article XX 
(a): protection of human life and health and under Article XX (b) of 
the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (WTO predecessor 
organization) to impose restrictive trade sanctions to curtail possible 
children’s human rights abuses including child labor  by TNCs.201 




 199. Id.  
 200. David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 1006 
(2003-2004). 
 201. Id.  
 202. Id.  
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iii.  Clarifying the language of international instruments 
Before any form of mechanism or legal path directly or indirect-
ly applicable to TNCs is in place at the national and/or international 
levels, there is a need to for the international community to agree on 
defining on what constitutes a ‘child’ and what in particular consti-
tutes a ‘child laborer’.203  “Every society values at least some of its 
children but not every society agrees on what is good for children, or 
on the correct mix of work and education which best fulfills chil-
dren’s present duties towards their families while preparing them for 
adulthood”.204  
Currently, there is a lack of a universally accepted method of es-
tablishing the differences in child labor standards between the devel-
oped and developing world, which is mainly due to the multiplicity of 
values, and cultures.205 This explains the ratification of the Minimum 
Age Convention by only a few developing nations and the resort to 
regional agreements (for instance, the African Child Convention) to 
close this gap.206  The current approach of setting a minimum age for 
work might be wrong altogether “as some child development experts 
believe that age is not always the best way to decide whether individ-
ual children are ready for work, or whether any particular kind of 
work is appropriate for a specific child”.207  
The significance of clarifying child labor is paramount for the 
child itself, for TNCs activities and ultimately to end exploitative 
child work.208 In the absence of a comprehensive and universal child 
labor definition TNCs operating globally might consider developing 
or making use of existing human and rights impact assessment meth-
 
 203. Id.  
 204. David M. Smolin, Conflict and Ideology in the International Campaign Against Child 
Labour, 16 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L. J. 383, 448 (1998-1999). 
 205. Mahmood Monshipouri, Promoting Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas of Integrating 
Developing Countries 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 25, 32-33 (2001) (addressing the 
question on how to promote universal human rights in developing countries and the 
globalisation of labour standards for child labour). 
 206. UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/esaro/children_youth_5930.html (last visited Sept. 18, 
2016). 
 207. S.L. Bachman, The Political Economy of Child Labour and Its Impact on International 
Business, BUSINESS ECONOMICS, Jul. 2000, at 30, 33. 
 208. David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, From Talk to Walk: The Emergence of Human Rights 
Responsibilities for Corporations at International Law, 44 VA. J. INT’L L. 931, 1015 
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ods (including child standards) to avoid social harm against local 
communities and fulfill children’s rights.209  
 
iv. Identifying the “root causes” of child labor 
The international community should take a more holistic ap-
proach to the issue of child labor addressing in particular the situation 
of young girls and those children involved in informal work who are 
presently overlooked in child labor instruments. This approach urges 
states to identify the “root causes” of child labor which in most cases 
includes a complex set of economic and social factors that violate 
children’s political, economic and social rights, discriminates against 
them and channels a number of children into poverty limiting their 
health, educational, moral development and active participation in 
society.  
It also urges powerful TNCs to construct a “structure of correla-
tive duties”, which they implicitly have towards states but especially 
towards children where they operate. Mainstreaming child labor con-
cerns, the rescue, rehabilitation, monitoring, enforcement and devel-
opment of reintegration programs to tackle worst forms of child labor 
within national policy development frameworks should be a priority. 
Even if the immediate abolition of child labor seems unrealistic, pri-
ority should be given to eradicate the worst forms of child labor.210  
To build such a supportive framework TNCs can contribute by 
leveraging more resources and developing a system of intensified co-
operation and “interactive regulation” with national governments, in-
ternational and, regional bodies, intergovernmental institutions 
(World Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF), civil society, individuals and 
children themselves.211   The right of the child to participate and to be 
heard (child agency) in the decision making process empowers chil-
dren as they can find ways to identify pragmatic solutions to the child 
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Corporate Responsibility: Towards a Human Rights Impact Assessment, 40 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 135, 166-67 (2007). 
 210. Mahmood Monshipouri, Promoting Universal Human Rights: Dilemmas of Integrating 
Developing Countries, 4 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 25, 53 (2001).  
 211. David Kinley & Junko Tadaki, supra note 209, at 933.  
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labor problematic.212 Such measures should be put in place against 
violations and provide victims with effective remedies protecting 
them and avoiding “re-victimization”.   Strengthening legal enforce-
ment and development mechanisms and the role of ILO-IPEC will be 
a key to the eradication of child labor, an objective that is closely 
linked to reaching the Millennium Development Goals.213  
 
V. Conclusion  
The problem of exploitative child labor is widespread within the 
international community and throughout history.   There is no defi-
ciency of international human right standards regarding child labor 
and one might argue that child labor as a contemporary form of slav-
ery, forced labor, torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment (Art. 
7; Art. 8 ICCPR) has reached jus cogens status from which no dero-
gation is allowed (Art. 4 ICCPR) thus potentially creating obligations 
erga omnes applicable to TNCs.214  
However, the increasing numbers of such exploitative phenome-
non must inevitably hoist serious doubts about the effectiveness of 
those standards.   The traditional state-centric approach of interna-
tional child labor standards and attendant international institutions 
such as the UN and ILO, are all presently unable and badly equipped 
to regulate powerful TNCs, which are, by definition, not limited by 
concepts of territorial sovereignty. International law has been reluc-
tant to regulate the social conduct of TNCs hence, the nonexistence 
of legally binding international human rights instruments for enter-
prises.  
In fact, corporations are not subjects of international law. Human 
rights obligations for non-state actors (in this case TNCs) are highly 
controversial not only because it trivializes the essence of human 
rights, but it also confers unsuitable power and legitimacy to TNCs. 
The counterargument has been that human rights belong to the indi-
 
 212. Anna A. Kornikova, International Child Labour Regulation: What Companies Need to 
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vidual and they cannot be deprived of their rights regardless of the 
circumstances. However, individuals and corporations are both capa-
ble of violating international human rights and therefore, children’s 
rights. 
The broadening of the historic paradigm, - that human rights 
standards are the state’s obligations alone, - emphasizes the responsi-
bility of influential TNCs which are seen as key in not only eradicat-
ing child labor but also in the attainment of children’s rights. There-
fore, the international human rights regime will be seriously 
compromised in the years ahead if it is unsuccessful in devising an 
appropriate and effective framework than the one that currently exists 
to take into account the role played by TNCs in realizing children’s 
rights.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
